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ABSTRACT
THOMAS BENTON YORK: A Review of the Bowl Championship Series and Proposal
of a Postseason Playoff to Remedy the Negative Ethical Implications ofthe Current
Model on Higher Education
(Under the direction of Dr. Charles K. Ross)
This thesis considers the current format of the postseason for the National
Collegiate Athletic Association(NCAA)Division I-Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS),
critiques its ethical implications, and proposes a twelve-team postseason playoff to
remedy the ethical dilemmas caused by the Bowl Championship Series(BCS)and the
commercialization of football at the Division I-FBS level. Research was focused on
sports law journals, books detailing the history of college football, transcripts from
Congressional hearings, and articles from prominent sports news sources. The first
chapter outlines the evolution of college football since the advent oftelevision as mass
media and highlights the medium’s direct effects on the administration ofthe sport. The
second chapter details the BCS and its implementation. The third chapter calls into
question the ethics of universities using football as a revenue generator without naming a
NCAA champion as is done in every other sport and the lower divisions of college
football. The fourth chapter lays the framework for a postseason playoff system and
addresses how it resolves the conflicts ofinterest presented by the BCS.
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Introduction
When the Rutgers football squad squared off against the team from Princeton
in Piscataway, New Jersey in 1869, those young men could never have imagined that
the game they played would one day be able to generate millions of dollars for their
universities or that millions of people would even care to see it. Even Walter Camp,
the father of American football, could not have dreamed the game he helped to
institutionalize would ever become so profitable. The games played by Walter
Camp’s teams at Yale and those young m.en in New Jersey were from a different
time. Not only is the game played differently, but tlie student athlete of the modem
era of college football plays for much more than bragging rights, the home state, and
the alma mater. On the line now are the six and seven figure contracts for head
coaches and university administrators, and at stake are the potential millions of
dollars available to the teams who play well enough to share in the cash cow ofthe
Bowl Championship Senes(BCS). If a team can gamer high enough profile, they can
play in a nationally broadcast game,cashing in on television rights. If an individual
player distinguishes himself as tmly outstanding, he can earn his own riches in the
National Football League(NFL), and his university can sell replicas of his jersey and
profit without worrying about having to compensate the player. If a team wins all of
its games, plays in the right conference, and markets its prowess to the media well
enough, they can have a shot at a national championship that can be disputed if
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anolher team has done the same.
Since 1998, there has been an institution that administers a formula to crown a
national champion after national a championship game has been played. The BCS
serves as this institution but not without controversy. Many commentators today
would argue that the BCS system serves all concerned parties far better than the
preceding system in which the Associated Press(AP)and ESPNAJSA Today Coaches
Poll determined who they perceived to be the best team in college football. Still,
cries from sportswriters and fans from all over the country ring out for a playoff
similar to that of nearly every other National Collegiate Athletic Association(NCAA)
sport. University presidents and athletic directors continue to shoot do^^m this idea
and continue to support the bowl system in which teams from diverse regions ofthe
country compete for the chance to end the season with a win. Also at stake are the
payouts for participation and winning, none so rewarding as the bowls making up the
BCS: the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California, the Orange Bowl in Miami, Florida, the
Sugar Bowl in New Orleans, Louisiana, the Fiesta Bowl in Tempe, Arizona, and the
recently added BCS National Championship Game that rotates between the four sites.
Many would argue that the current system has simply put a new name on the
old system and even served to further the commercialization ofcollege football. With
an understanding of how college football has become so profitable and how the BCS
has come into being, questions arise about the system and its implications. WTiat does
the BCS actually do? What are the effects ofthe BCS? When these questions are
answered, the most im.portant issue comes to light: is the BCS an ethical system?
After considering the ethical dilemmas in which the BCS places universities, it

2

becomes clear that a postseason playoff would be far better for the interests of
football at the Division I-Football Subdivision(FBS)level.

3

Chapter One
College Football History and Context
How did the game of football become so popular and profitable? The short
answer is simply television. The Modem Era of college football evolved with the
explosion of television set ownership across America and the organized regulations of
broadcasts by the NCAA beginning in 1951. The first televised college football game
was played on Saturday September 30, 1939 between Fordham with its famed “Seven
Blocks of Granite” and Waynesboro State. The primitive NBC broadcast ofthe game
came only a month after the same network had aired a Major League Baseball game
for the first time between the Brooklyn Dodgers and the Cincinnati Reds. While most
universities feared that television would empty seats at games and lose revenue at the
gates, the University of Pennsylvania as well as Notre Dame revolutionarily pursued
televised broadcasts of their games in order to market their teams to a broader
audience. With college graduates making up such a small part ofthe populous, the
state university and its football team simply were not the linkage institution they are
today. All one had to do to truly be a Pittsburgh Steelers fan was to reside in or near
the city, but the average steelworker was not going to care about the University of
Pittsburgh because he had no connection. With Penn games broadcast by the Philco
Corporation in Philadelphia beginning in 1940, Philadelphians who were not among
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the 60,000 fans who routinely attended games at Franklin Field could follow the team
and develop a connection.*
Notre Dame had the benefit of being the nation’s premier Catholic University,
and for that reason had a built-in national fan base that schools like the University of
Oregon simply did not have. So it was only natural in 1950 for Penn to sell its
broadcasting rights to ABC and Notre Dame to DuMont for $150,000 and $85,000
respectively. These television contracts provided the impetus for creating the modem
NCAA,as university administrators across the country were beginning to see ticket
sales decline and feared that unless they acted as a unit, television v/ouid bankmpt
their athletic departments and destroy the sport. Thus, in January 1951, the newly
revamped NCAA voted 161-7 to restrict television contracts that were not negotiated
by the NCAA. Penn Director of Athletics Francis T. Murray called the plan both
short-sighted and illegal as it pertained to antitrust laws, an argument that would be
silenced by threats from the NCAA and pressure from other Ivy League institutions.^
T his new television policy represented the first time the NCAA exercised
authority over its member institutions. The Association had developed after a 1906
meeting with President Theodore Roosevelt and the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and
Princeton to discuss regulating the game to avoid the bmtal injuries and even deaths
that had become common as a result of particular formations and tactics. From then
on, the NCAA mainly served as a regulator for the mles ofthe game,^
In 1948, the NCAA passed the Sanity Code, which outlawed athletic
scholarships, off campus recruiting, stipends for players, and required schools to hold
'Dunnavant, Keith. The Fifty Year Seduction. New York; St. Martin’s Press, 2004, 2-4.
^ Dunnavant
5, 9.
^ Dunnavant
18.
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athletes to the same academic standards as the rest of its student body. The Sanity
Code was a disaster. In 1950 when there was an opportunity to enforce it, the
necessary two-thirds majority needed to expel seven universities charged with
egregious negligence of the Sanity Code was not attained, and the NCAA lost
credibility with its members as well as its critics. That changed with the new
television plan in 1951, and more importantly in 1952 with the passage ofthe 9**^
Bylaw, v/hich gave powers to the NCAA to legislate and enforce regulations and
policies.
The NCAA first put its newfound authority on display in 1952 with the
yearlong suspension of the University of Kentucky men’s basketball team. When
Kentucky’s legendary coach Adolph Rupp did not fight the suspension, all NCAA
member institutions knew that the Enforcement Division created by NCAA Executive
Walter Byers would be more than hot air. The Enforcement Division also served to
highlight the value of bowl games when it leveled a two-year television and bowl
appearance ban against the Auburn University football program in 1956 for recruiting
violations. Bowl games up to this point had been a reward for the players on the team
after a good season. There was a monetary reward for plajdng, but the main focus
was in giving the players an opportunity to travel and play games against teams
whom they would not traditionally have the opportunity. As television revenues
continued to rise and more national exposure came as a result, appearances in these
bowl games became more and more important to the success ofa football program.^

Dunnavant..., 19, 14-15.
^ Dunnavant ,27-28.

6

The concept of the bowl game began in 1902 when the Pasadena Tournament
of Roses Association invited the University of Michigan to play against Stanford
University in order to be able to pay for the city’s annual Parade of Roses and the
other events associated with it. The Rose Bowl stadium was constructed in 1923 and
first hosted the University of Southern California and Pennsylvania State University.
The Tournament committee invited the best team from the eastern United States to
play against the Pacific Coast Conference champion. These teams included Alabama,
Brown, and Wisconsin. However, in 1947 the Rose Bowl made a decision that would
change the course of college football history: the Pacific Coast Conference champion
would face off against the champion ofthe Big Ten Conference every year. This
agreement allowed the two conferences with the largest television markets to face off
every year in a nationally televised New Year’s Day exhibition.^
Recognizing how valuable the bowls were becoming and taking advantage of
the NCAA’s new power, Byers took control of the bowl games by mandating that
member institutions could only participate in NCAA sanctioned bowl games. These
games had to meet particular requirements including that 75% of all revenues be
awarded to the participating schools.*^ At the same time, Byers negotiated the first
national broadcast ofthe Rose Bowl in 1951. The Orange, Cotton, and Sugar Bowls
would follow in 1953. As revenues from television grew throughout the 1950’s and
1960’s, Byers continued to maintain a policy that distributed those revenues between
the NCAA member institutions and restricted television appearances regardless ofthe

^ Determining a Champion on the Field: A Comprehensive Review ofthe BCS and Postseason College
Football, Hearing Before the Subcommittee Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection ofthe
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House ofRepresentatives,7 December 2005 (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2005), 39.
^ Dunnavant..., 27.
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size of the program. A small minority of universities was responsible for the
profitable ratings of the broadcasts, but the policies on football and television still
came from the voting majority that either did not draw significant viewership or did
not play football at all. From 1960 to 1970, revenues for the NCAA television plan
grew from S3.125 million to S12 million. At the same time, NFL’s television revenue
increased from $3.1 million to S45.6 million.^ Because the NFL had received
antitrust exemption and dedicated its resources to marketing the game,the popularity
soared especially after the merger with its competitor the American Football League.
At the same time, the NCAA continued to force unmarketable games while restricting
its ratings-grabbing teams from getting too much broadcast time. The NCAA had an
extremely marketable product, but Byers continued to restrict its money making
potential, much to the fhistration of many universities who were providing the large
television audiences without receiving proportional compensation.
By 1973, the NCAA realized it would be prudent to reorganize its now
cumbersome membership into three divisions: Division I, II, and III.^ Initially,
Division I included 273 members of which only 126 played any football. Ofthose
10

126 institutions, around 80 teams played in major conferences,

The disparity

between the revenue generating capabilities ofthe large programs and the costs of
competing for the smaller universities became truly significant in the 19/0’s with a
weak U.S. economy and the passage of new federal regulations requiring a greater
commitment to women’s athletics. These financial struggles culminated in talks

Duimavant... ,36-37, 89.
^ Division I and II award athletic scholarships Division III does not.
Watterson, John Sayle. College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 2002, 333.
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centered on cutting costs in order to provide a more even playing field. During this
process. Long Beach State president Stephen Horn devised a plan to ease the budget
burdens for the smaller programs like that ofthe school he represented. Under his
Robin Hood Plan” as it would be tabbed,50% of all television revenues would be
shared evenly among Division I schools regardless ofsize or firequency of television
appearance. The other 50% would be shared evenly between the member institutions
of Division 11 and 111. The Robin Hood Plan also proposed a similar distribution of
bowl winnings.‘’ The NCAA Council eventually rejected the plan in 1975 citing that
if it were put up for a vote and passed as expected, it would effectively end the
NCAA “as we know it.”'^ This series of events provided a stimulus for the major
college football programs to take up the fight to seize control ifrom what they
considered mob rule in the NCAA.
The creation ofthe College Football Association(CFA)in 1976 coupled with
the 1946 agreement between the Big Ten Conference and what would become the
Pac-10 Conference shaped the landscape ofcollege football for the following thirty
years. The CFA was made up of61 universities from 7 conferences including the
Southeastern Conference(SEC), Big Eight, Atlantic Coast Conference(ACC),
Southwest Conference(SWC)as well as independents including Notre Dame,Penn
State, and Florida State among others. Driving the creation ofthe CFA was the desire
of the institutions with major college football programs to discuss discontent with the
NCAA’s restrictive television plan. One of their goals was to influence the NCAA to
subdivide Division I. Their first attempt to gamer the necessary votes failed in

Watterson.
Dunnavant

334-335.
119.
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Janiiaiy of 1978 but was eventually passed later in the same year. Missing from the
CFA were the Pac-10 and Big Ten who remained loyal to Byers and the NCAA
where the two conferences enjoyed influence and a large number of television
appearances.*' Their alliance was inextricably linked to their Rose Bowl relationship,
14

which by 1979 was paying out a combined $5.2 million.
The bowls had steadily been growing in popularity and profitability with the
growth of television. In 1958, there were six bowl games. By 1971,there were 11,
and that number increased to 15 by 1978. Ofthose bowls, the most prestigious were
the “Big Four”. While television made the newer games viable, the Sugar, Cotton,
Rose, and Orange Bowls were elite. During the 1970’s, the bowls were paying out an
average total of$15 million to the participating schools, the bulk of which was going
to the members of the Pac-8, Big Ten,SWC,SEC,and Big Eight.

The Big Four

were broadcast on national television and became synonymous with New Year’s Day.
Although newer bowls such as the Liberty and Peach Bowls began featuring
compelling match-ups, they simply did not gamer the respect ofthe Big Four and
certainly v/ere not to be played on New Year’s Day. However,the Fiesta Bowl in
Tempe,.\rizona served to shake up the status quo for the bowl season as well as
influence conference realignment.
The Fiesta Bowl began in 1971 with a game between Arizona State University
and Florida State University. The payout for what was at the time the smallest bowl
game amounted to $168,000, and the broadcast contract was worth $500 for the radio

Watterson..., 336-338.
Dunnavant..., 98.
Dunnavant. ., 95,99-100.
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rights.

The Fiesta Bowl began with an automatic tie-in with the champion ofthe

Western Athletic Conference(WAC), which perennially was won by the upstart
Arizona State program. In 1975, Arizona State finished the season undefeated, and
the Fiesta Bowl negotiated a deal with Big Eight commissioner Chuck Neinas to send
the loser of the Oklahoma-Nebraska game to Tempe for the bowl game. The
Comhuskers lost the game, and then found themselves overmatched by the underdog
Arizona State team. The win gave legitimacy to both Arizona State and the Fiesta
Bowl. As a result CBS moved the game to primetime on Christmas Day. The Fiesta
Bowl’s agreement to move the date of the game was significant because it showed the
impact of television once again: attendance would drop, but ratings would increase.
The 1977 Fiesta Bowl between Penn State and Arizona State was the fourth highest
rated bowl game, finishing in front ofthe Sugar Bowl. Anzona State’s win had
monumental effects: the Pac-8 absorbed the Sun Devils and their in-state rival
Aiizona to become the Pac-10 and the Fiesta Bowl ended its relationship with the
WAC. The success of the 1977 game resulted in a contract for $400,000 with NBC
17

for the 1978 season.

The Fiesta Bowl coup not only shocked the organizers ofthe Big Four, but
also sent a message to network executives and local businesses in big cities all around
America that the market for postseason football was ripe and profitable. Over the
course of the 1960’s and 1970’s as college football became more popular and ratings
continued to rise, the bowl games created a financial and competitive advantage to the
teams that qualified. Notre Dame had been absent from the post season for 45 years

Determining a Champion. 35.
Dunnavant..., 103-104.
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on the grounds that the bowl games interfered with the academic calendar. In 1970
the university realized it could not continue this policy and remain competitive. That
year the Irish played against the University of Texas in the Cotton Bowl. The Pac-8
and Big Ten had restricted their members from participating in any bowl games other
than the Rose Bowl since their agreement in 1947. With the growing number ofbowl
games and the exposure and monetary rewards becoming more important, the
conferences opened up for other bowl games beginning in 1974. Ticket sales had
always provided the bulk of revenue for the bowl games, but beginmng in the early
1970’s it came from the broadcast rights. The payouts for the Sugar Bowl were
$22,759 for Tulane and Temple in 1935. By 1967 the payout had jumped up to
$236,000 and then $900,000 in 1976. The Orange Bowl payout went from $259,324
in 1967 to $1.05 million 1976. The 1974 broadcast rights for the Orange Bowl footed
the bill for the payout, fetching $2 million from the networks in 1974 and then $2.8
million in 1981. With an average 21.8 million homes tuning in for the Rose Bowl in
the 1970’s, it is no surprise that its broadcast rights reached $2 million in 1974 and
18

$4.3 million in 1981.

Exposure from a national broadcast and the opportunity to

cash a huge check for the conference were vital to maintain a successful program,
particularly with the passage of Title IX ofthe Education Amendments Act.
President Richard Nixon signed the Education Amendments Acton June 23,
1972 which dealt with a wealth of issues facing education. Title IX ofthe Act demes
federal funding to universities and institutions ofsecondary education that fail to
provide equal opportunities to both male and female students. The Act did not
specifically address the realm of athletics, but on July 21,1975 Congress passed
Dunnavant..., 95-96, 98.
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federal regulations on athletics with Title IX as the vehicle. There is a common
misconception that Title IX specifically stipulates that universities spend one dollar
on v/omen’s sports for every dollar they spend on men’s sports, or that it dictates an
equal number of teams for both genders. Such specific mandates do not exist, but
universities must meet requirements in three different areas: participation, athletic
financial assistance, and treatment of athletes. In regards to participation, the
institution must ensure that it is meeting one of three gauges for successful equality:
First, that the proportionality of male and female athletes is consistent with that ofthe
overall enrollment. Second, that the university is making every effort to expand the
programs of the underrepresented gender consistent with that group’s interest.
Finally that the “interests and abilities ofthe underrepresented sex are fully and
»19

effectively accommodated by the existing programs.
The second major prong ofcompliance is actually the only part that dictates
spending on athletes. This prong states that scholarships be awarded between males
and females in proportion with the number of participating athletes between the two
genders. While the second prong is in letter the only monetary regulation, in practice
the third holds much greater effect on the spending practices of umversities. The
third prong states that facilities, publicity, equipment, coaching, tutoring, housing,
travel, medical treatment, support services, and recruiting be comparable between
20

men’s and women’s teams.

This prong creates the misperceptions ofthe specifics

of Title IX, but the actual effect is essentially the same. Universities suddenly had a
new realm of mandates and expenditures.

' www.womenssportsfoundation.org
www.womenssportsfoundation.org
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Beginning in 1980 with the Office of Civil Rights enforcing Title IX under the
authority of the Department of Education, athletic departments all across the country
worked to create new women’s athletic programs at the same time many were
experiencing skyrocketing costs to remain competitive in football and basketball.
Those costs were coupled with greater revenues coming in from television, but rather
than reinvesting that revenue into the programs that raised it, a large portion ofit was
being pumped into programs that generated no revenue at all. Every year the number
of women participating in collegiate athletics grew: women made up 37% of
21

collegiate athletes by 1995 jumping up from 15% in 1972.

The new federal

regulation was creating opportunities for young women to receive a college education
as had never been done before, but the new costs were putting pressure on
universities and specifically football programs to generate revenue like never before.
By 1981, the CFA members had finally had enough of being subject to the
majonty rule of the smaller schools in Division I-A and formed the CFA Television
Committee at the same time Byers was negotiating a new NCAA contract. Because
the Big Ten and Pac-10 succeeded in 1978 to include the Ivy League in Division I-A
despite the conference’s deliberate intentions to not participate in major college
football, the CFA members remained the minority. Big Eight commissioner and
former NCAA staff member Chuck Neinas began acting as the executive director of
the CFA in 1980, and in August of 1981 Neinas signed a four year deal with NBC
worth an unprecedented $180 million. The NCAA immediately threatened to expel
any institution that participated in the new NBC plan, a threat that carried weight
because expulsion would result in every other sports team being excluded from
Valentin Iram. “Title IX: A Brief History,” WEEA Equity Resource Center Digest
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1997), 7.

participating in NCAA sanctioned events such as the basketball tournaments and the
College World Series.““ The CFA felt that the NCAA lacked a strong legal basis for
such action, and in 1981 the University of Georgia and the University of Oklahoma
brought suit against the NCAA in federal district court stating that they should be
allowed to negotiate their own contracts. Not long after, the NCAA managed to lure
some of the CFA members to Byers’s plan by making concessions for payouts and
cutting Division I-A to 92 institutions. Although the CFA television plan fell
through, in September of 1982, Judge Juan Burciarga ruled that the broadcasting
rights of Georgia and Oklahom.a football games were property ofthe institutions and
23

therefore were to be negotiated at their discretion.
The ultimate victory for the CFA came in July of 1984 when the United States
Supreme Court ruled 7-2 for the position of Oklahoma and Georgia in the case of
NCAA V. Board ofRegents ofthe University ofOklahoma, et al. Justice John Paul
Stevens delivered the opinion of the court:
...There can be no doubt that the challenged practices ofthe NCAA
constitute a “restraint of trade” in the sense that they limit members’
freedom to negotiate and enter in to their own television contracts...By
participating in an association which prevents member institutions
from competing against each other on the basis of price or kind of
television rights that can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA
member institutions have created a horizontal restraint- an agreement
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one
another. A restraint of this type has often been held to be unreasonable
24
as a matter of law...

The immediate impact of the decision effectively allowed the individual
institutions and conferences to begin to negotiate their own broadcast contracts.
22

Dunnavant
122, 130, 133-135, 142.
Watterson..., 345-346.
24
Justice John Paul Stevens, NCAA v. Board ofRegents ofthe University ofOklahoma, et al, 1984.

23
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Members could agree to a voluntary NCAA plan, but none would agree to one
because of the NCAA’s ability to use television appearances as punishment for rule
infractions. The NCAA still maintained its authority, but losing control oftelevision
exposure took away one of its most powerful tools in enforcing its policies. At the
same time that the NCAA lost its most significant central control, the CFA effectively
ended as soon as it won. Neinas envisioned the CFA as a version of Division I-A
with only the football juggernauts and desired to create a television plan for his new
super-conference. The ideals that brought the CFA to the bargaining table, however,
doomed Neinas’s dream. In 1984, the ACC signed a contract with CBS,and Neinas
25

struggled to maintain the union of the CFA.
Neinas succeeded in keeping the SEC on board with the CFA in 1987 when
the SEC attempted to consummate a deal with ABC worth $25 million. Still, without
the Big Ten and the Pac-10, the CFA was simply not valuable or marketable enough
to make it untouchable. The CFA’s days were officially numbered in 1990 when
Notre Dame decided to disassociate from the CFA and sign its own deal with NBC
worth $35 million to broadcast all of its games. Immediately, the CFA had lost its
one member with a truly national following. Though the Notre Dame exit was
crippling as it devalued the CFA’s deal with ABC,the death blow came in 1994 when
the SEC signed away its television rights to CBS. Between 1990 and 1994, the
landscape of college football changed more drastically than it had in the forty years
preceding it.

25
26

Watterson
Watterson

26

347-348.
350.
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With the market being flooded with more broadcasts of games than ever
before, the rising costs of maintaining a competitive program, and the splitting of
revenues with women’s athletic teams, university administrators were searching for
as much money as they could find, hence the Notre Dame departure from the CFA.
Almost half of Division I-A institutions were operating on deficits by the late 1980’s,
including the University of Alabama, one ofthe country’s perennial football powers.
Though football revenues had more than tripled from 1978 to 1988, the athletic
department was still losing money as a result ofthe skyrocketing costs ofremaining
competitive in football as well as a $1,368,937 price tag on women’s sports programs
that had generated $20,591. The immediate answer to the problem was in raising the
price of priority season tickets to as much as $1,000. Fortunately for Alabama, more
27

than 20,000 fans signed on and helped generate $7 million more a year.
If Alabama was struggling to pay its bills, clearly the economic burden was
hammering the rest of the SEC. In the late 1980’s SEC commissioner Harvey
Schiller stumbled over an obscure NCAA rule that would revolutionize college
football when put in practice: if a conference had 12 members,it could put on a
conference championship game. The Big Ten had expanded to 11 teams in 1990 with
the inclusion ofPenn State, and at the same time added an entire new region of
television sets. If the SEC could convince a few more schools to come aboard,they
could create a made-for-television championship game and open up their product to
new regions. With South Carolina joining in 1990 and Arkansas joining m 1992,the
SEC now had the requisite 12 teams it needed, and the first conference championship
game was staged in 1992. The game was a huge success, making $40 million in its
27

Dunnavant..., 185-188.
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first five years with an average 10 million homes tuning in. Armed with its newfound
financial success and greater geographic appeal, the SEC ventured into its own
28

contract with CBS and effectively ended any legitimacy for the CFA.

Conference realignment in the early 1990’s saw the end ofthe SWC,the
expansion of the Big Eight to the Big XII, and the emergence ofthe Big East as a
football conference. The new landscape of college football placed an unprecedented
degree of power in the hands of the conference commissioners whose primary goal in
the early 1990’s was to find new ways to generate revenue for their member
institutions. As the institution ofcollege football had become better marketed and
more sophisticated, the customer became more sophisticated as well. Over the years,
public outcry for a true national championship became louder and louder. As long as
the major conferences had automatic tie-ins to the Big Four bowl games, it w^as
unlikely that a #1 verse #2 game would occur, particularly with the emergence ofthe
University of Miami, Florida State, and Penn State as powerful independent
programs As conference commissioners and television executives heard the
complaints from fans and sportswriters, the bowl system continued to make selections
long before the end of the season with selection based on economic impact rather than
a team’s objective success.
The NCAA men’s basketball tournament had been a huge television success
for decades, and fans pointed to it as proof that there was more money to be made at
the same time that the desire for a true national champion could be satisfied. Chuck
Neinas had actually presented a playoff model in 1984 that he believed would
generate $55 million using bowl games as semifinal and final games. By his
28

Durmavant

224, 231, 236-237.
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estimates, a thirty-second commercial for his eight team playoff would fetch
29

$225,000, the same as an ad during the World Series or the NFL playoffs.

NCAA

executive director Dick Schultz told the 1993 NCAA Convention that “Ultimately,
»30

the playoff issue will be decided on its financial merits.

In December of 1993, the

NCAA surprised its critics when it formed a committee to determine the feasibility of
a playoff in Division I-A. The committee was made up largely of NCAA
administrators, but the most notable member was then-UCLA chancellor Charles E.
Young, a vocal opponent of a playoff The preceding year had seen the former
NCAA executive director propose looking into a playoff as well as proposals to set
one up submitted by Nike, Inc. as well as the Disney Co. The Nike proposal was
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even reviewed by the NCAA Presidents Commission but discarded without a vote.
Young, the committee’s chairman, in his reflections for The Chronicle of
Higher Education ten years later explained the committee’s findings:
After reviewing volumes of data and conducting a number of
wide-ranging discussions, the committee held a straw poll and
voted, by an overwhelming majority, to support an eight-team
playoff system that would rely on six bowl games(we
suggested the Rose, Sugar, Orange, Fiesta, Cotton, and Citrus
Bowls). Four would be played on January 1 at four bowl
arenas to determine the pairings for two semifinal games to be
played the following week in the two remaining bowls. The
national championship would be played on the Martin Luther
King Jr. holiday in mid-January in one ofthe major
metropolitan stadiums. The eight participants each year would
include the champions of five or six major conferences and two
or three at-large selections...The intent ofthe proposal was to:
(a) provide a playoff involving participants who would be
required to win their conference championship to get there;(b)
ensure the continuation of a strong financially viable bowl
29
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349.
Dunnavant..., 250.
Maisel, Ivan. “To Carefully Go Where 1-A Has Never Gone Before,” The Sporting News(December
20, 1993).
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structure (each of the designated bowls would be a “premier”
game because each would play a major part in championship
determination);(c) provide coordination ofthe postseason
format by member NCAA Division I-A institutions, rather than
by television companies and commercial sponsors;(d)provide
increased revenue for a broad range of Division I-A programs
within a controlled postseason environment; and (e) preserve
32
the quality of the bowls and community interests they served.
The playoff committee was broken up before it could make a formal recommendation
in 1994 because the university presidents expressed concerns that a playoff would
contribute to the “overcomniercialization” of postseason football as well as add
games that would hurt the participating students at the beginning of a new semester.
The concern carrying the most weight was by power conference commissioners who
wanted to maintain control of the postseason and its hefty payouts that were already
33

guaranteed to the members of their conferences.
The alternative in the early 1990’s was an agreement between many ofthe
CFA conferences that became known as the College Football Bowl Alliance. The
agreement between the SEC,Big XII, Big East, ACC,and Notre Dame in 1995
removed the automatic conference championship tie-ins to set up a number one
versus number two match-up that would rotate between three bowl sites. The
conference champions ofthe Bowl Alliance conferences would be guaranteed a spot
m one ofthe three elite bowl games, and the remaining two berths would go at large,
allowing for Notre Dame or other teams that did not win their conference to
participate if they met certain criteria. While automatic tie-ins were removed from
the new three elite Alliance bowls, the Sugar, Orange, and Fiesta, the conferences set

32
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up systems to create automatic tie-ins for the second tier games, leaving teams from
Conference USA (C-USA), the WAC,and the Mid American Conference(MAC)to
desperately find bowls that would host their best programs. The result was another
34

jump in the number of bowl games, which reached 23 by 1996.
With the creation of the new Bowl Alliance came a 30 percent increase in
overall bowl revenue as a result of the new three-year deal with the networks, bowls,
and conferences. However, the goal of achieving an undisputed national champion
still proved problematic as the Big Ten and Pac-10 still clung to the Rose Bowl that
pumped $13 million a year into the two conferences and remained isolated from the
Bowl Alliance. Their position changed, though, in 1995 when Penn State and
Nebraska both finished the season undefeated, but Penn State was committed to the
Rose Bowl and could not play in the Bowl Alliance’s national championship game.
Big Ten commissioner Jim Delaney decided that in the new world of college football,
it was best for the Big Ten and the Pac-10 to get on board with the rest of major
college football, and the two conferences committed to become part ofthe Alliance
following the 1997 season. The new agreement with ABC was v/orth $500 million
over seven years and allowed for the per-team payout for those reaching the elite
35

bowls to reach $12 million a year.
The new setup created a disparity between the Bowl Alliance and the more
than fifty other members of Division I-A like never before. The rewards for
appearing in the Big Four bowl games became more and more staggering, and even
the higher paying second-tier bowl games blocked the entry ofthe non-Alliance
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leagues, despite outstanding performances by teams such as the 1996 Brigham Young
University team which finished the season ranked fifth in the Associated Press poll
amassing an astonishing fourteen wins and only one loss. In the 1996 bowl season,
the eight schools participating in the Alliance games shared $64 million while the
remaining $35 million was split among the twenty-eight other schools participating in
bowl games. Less than $4 million of that $35 million was awarded to non-Alliance
36

schools.

Clearly, teams were not being rewarded for their success on the field so

much as their ability to generate revenue and maintain the status quo ofthe haves and
have-nots of college football.
In the summer of 1997 the United States Senate judicial committee convened
to discuss the antitrust implications ofthe Bowl Alliance. The committee subpoenaed
administrators, conference officials, players, and coaches to obtain the perspectives of
the diverse facets of college football. Tulane law professor and president ofthe
Sports Lawyers Association Gary R. Roberts spoke before the committee about the
anticompetitive impact ofthe Association, claiming that “it enormously enlarges the
financial and prestige gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ ofcollege
football. ' With pressure from the federal government mounting,the Bowl Alliance
began to work out a deal that would allow for non-Alliance teams finishing in the top
six to be guaranteed a spot in one ofthe elite bowls. Following the 1997 season, the
system would take on a new name and some systematic nuances, but essentially there
would be little difference.

Antitrust Implications ofthe College Bowl Alliance, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust
Business Rights, and Competition of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 22 May
1997(Washington: U.S. Government Press, 1997), 102.
Antitrust Implications.. 93.
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The Bowl Alliance became known as the Bowl Championship Series in 1998
with the inclusion of the Big Ten and Pac-10 as well as the potential entry ofone of
the teams from conferences without an automatic BCS bid. The reunion between the
Big Ten and Pac-10 with the rest of the major conferences represented the end ofa
38

twenty-five year era of gridlock,

For the first time since 1947 the Rose Bowl could

potentially host teams from conferences outside of the Big Ten and Pac-10. While
the inclusion of the Big Ten and Pac-10 was the most important aspect ofthe new
agreement, another important component was the use of a formula to determine the
number one versus number two match-up. The formula has been tweaked every year
to address the latest complaints with the system as it has been fraught with
controversy since its inception. The 2000 season saw Florida State receive a
championship berth over Miami. Both teams had only one loss, but Florida State s
one loss was to Miami. In 2003, Louisiana State University won the BCS
championship, but the AP determined that the University of Southern California team
was the best in the country. The BCS had been designed to avoid split
championships, and it had only taken five years to have one. In 2004 USC,
Oklahoma, and Auburn each finished their regular seasons undefeated, and USC met
Oklahoma in the BCS title game. Auburn was left to wonder what else they could
have done to even have the opportunity to play for the national championship. Once
again the playoff proponents complained that the system is simply a continuation of
the old with a new name.
It is important to note that the current BCS is essentially an agreement
between conferences, television networks, and bowl committees over which the
38
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NCAA claims no jurisdiction. Controversy surrounding the anticompetitive effects of
the BCS resulted in congressional hearings in 2003 to discuss the antitrust
implications of the arrangement on the Division I-A teams outside ofthe BCS
conferences. These hearings were headlined by Tulane University president Scott S.
Cowen who lambasted the BCS as an illegal trust that maintained a two-tiered system
of“haves” and “have-nots” in Division I-A. The hearings led to restructuring ofthe
BCS agreements and Cowen’s complaints seem to be quelled.
In the summer before the 2007 season, the NCAA changed the names ofthe
Division I subdivisions to Division I Football Bowl Subdivision(FBS)for I-A and
Division I Football Championship Subdivision(FCS)for I-AA,sending an unspoken
message that the NCAA maintains solidarity with the bowl system. The 2006 season
saw the addition of a BCS Championship game that was separate from the BCS bowls
but rotates between the BCS sites. Sportswriters have continued to make their
arguments for and against a playoff, and fans have overwhelmingly showed support
for a playoff system. The conferences and university presidents remain firmly
committed to the bowl system, and it is unlikely their opinions will change any time
soon without outside influences or an irresistible financial windfall.
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Chapter Two
The Bowl Championship Series
The Bowl Championship Series(BCS)is often misunderstood to be

an

organization or an event sponsored and regulated by the NCAA. Rather, the BCS is
an agreement between conference administrators, the University of Notre Dame,bowl
committees, and television networks that provides for the selection ofteams to the
BCS bowl games, determines the distribution ofcash winnings between the parties,
and matches the top ranked teams within the BCS rankings system in order to name a
BCS national champion. There is no BCS commissioner or even a central BCS
national office with a staff.
Every year the commissioners ofthe Division I Football Bowl Subdivision
(FBS)conferences anoi the athletic director fi'om the University ofNotre Dame meet
to discuss and evaluate the BCS and how it best serves the interests involved. Over

the years, the agreement has evolved in large part due to the questions ofrestricted
enti-y hy the conferences who do not receive automatic bids to the five BCS bowl
games While the NC.AA does not exercise any authority over the BCS,it does help
to administer the agreement's stipulations in its certification of postseason bowl
games. Before the 2007 season, the champion ofthe SEC,Pac-10, Big Ten, Big XII,
Big East, and ACC receive automatic invitations to one of these elite bowl games. If
Notre Dame finishes ranked in the top eight ofthe BCS rankings, it will receive an
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automatic bid. If a team from a non-BCS conference, defined as the teams from the
WAC,MAC,C-USA,Sun Belt Conference, and the Mountain West Conference
(MWC),finishes in the top twelve in the final BCS standings or finishes in the top
sixteen and ranks ahead of a conference champion,they will automatically qualify for
a BCS game. However, no more than one team from the non-BCS conferences can
qualify for an automatic invitation to a BCS game even iftwo teams fit the criteria.
The two teams finishing first and second in the final BCS rankings are matched up in
the BCS Championship Game. If the ten spots are not filled-by these automatic
qualifications, the team ranked fourth in the BCS standings will receive an automatic
berth if it is from a conference that receives an automatic berth annually and a non
conference champion from the same conference is not playing in the national
39

championship game.

The remaining slots go to at-large teams. In order to qualify for an at-large
invitation, a team must win at least nine games and finish in the top fourteen teams in
the final BCS standings. Before the BCS and the College Bowl Alliance, the bowl
committees had to compete against one another for teams and television contracts.
Under the BCS,the Rose, Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta Bowls agree to rules govemmg
the selection process. Each bowl is contractually obliged to select the conference
champion of a particular conference as host ofthe game: the ACC hosts the Orange
Bowl, the SEC hosts the Sugar Bowl,the Big XII hosts the Fiesta Bowl, and the Rose
Bowl takes the champions ofthe Big Ten and Pac-10. Ifthe champion of one of
these conferences finishes either first or second in the BCS standings, the bowl that
would have hosted the number one team gets the first choice of a replacement.
NCAA 2006-0’^ Postseason Football Handbook, 10-13.
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followed by the bowl tied to the number two team. If the champions ofthe Big Ten
and Pac-10 play in the ehampionship game,the Rose Bowl gets the first two choices
of replacement teams. When choosing a replacement, the bowl committee cannot
take a team from the national championship game or a conference champion hosting
another bowl. If two bowls lose the host team,the bowl losing the team ramced
number one can only take a team from tlie same conference as the niunber two team if
the bowl losing the number two team agrees. The order of selection is based on the
proximity to the championship game: the bowl taking place closest to the
championship game gets first pick ofthe uncommitted automatic qualifiers and atlarge teams. The second closest bowl has the second pick, and the bowl game slated
to play immediately following the Rose Bowl has the third selection. There can be no
40

more than two teams from the same conference participating in the BCS.
Without the BCS rating system, all ofthese guidelines would fall apart. One
of the key complaints about the pre-BCS football system was the frequency of split
national championships between the AP writers’ poll and United Press international
(UPi)coaches’ poll. How could coaches have the time to watch every other team
w'hen they were spending all their time preparing for the next game? How could the
opinions of writers be taken completely seriously when their perception ?s going to be
influenced by the region ofthe countiy where they write? There had been
mathematic polls offered for decades, including Jeff Sagarin’s poll wtich is printed in
k-SA Today. The BCS poll seeks to utilize both the emotionless objectivity ofthe
computer polls along with the human judgment of the USA Today Coaches Poll and
the Hams Interactive Poll.
NCAA 2006-07 Postseason Football Handbook, lC-13.
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A team is scored in the USA Today Coaches Poll ^d Hams Interactive Poll
by its points in the poll divided by the total points possible. Because the number of
voters is different and even varies from week to week,the scores are computed as a
percentage of the possible total. The USA Today Coaches Poll is voted on by sixty'
Division 1 FBS head coaches who must be a member ofthe American Football
41

Coaches Association,

The Harris Interactive Poll began during the 2005 season

after the Associated Press no longer allowed the BCS to use its poll. The ^\P made
the decision in December of2004 based on a belief that the BCS damaged and
continues to damage A.P.'s reputation for honesty and integrity in its news accounts
1)42

through the forced association ofthe A.F poll with the B.C.S. rankings.

The

Harris Interactive Poll is made up of“a panel offormer players, coaches,
administrators and current and former media who are committed to ranking the
college teams each week” ofthe football season. The voters are chosen randomly
from a pool of around 300 people who have been nominated by confei-ence officials
and independent institutions. The selections are designed to achieve a statistically
43

valid representation of all conferences and universities in Division I-rBS.

In

addition to these two human polls, the BCS uses six computer based rankings
including the Jeff Sagarin rating, x^mderson & Hester, Richard Billingslev, the Colley
Matrix. Kenneth Massey., and Dr. Peter Wolfe. The highest and lowest computer
averages are dropped, and the remaining lour values are averaged and caicuiated as a
pe'-centage of 100.

w\v A' ibatoday.con ^
‘Associated Press Football Poll is Pulled from.B.C.S. Equation,” Pete Thamel. The Nevj York Times,
22 December 2004.
43
www.harrisinteractive.ccm

42

28

Each computer poll has its own unique formula with unique methodologies.
The Anderson & Hester rankings, for instance, are not computed until the fifth week
of the season. Avoiding preseason bias is a common goal ofthese computer rankings
as well as avoiding regional, conference, and historical biases. Dr. Wesley N. Colley,
who has a Ph.D. in Astrophysical Science from Princeton University, claims that his
Colley Matrix is free of bias because of its focus on wins and losses. The Sagann
Ratings and the Billingsley Report take into consideration a team’s status as the home
team or the visitor team in their calculations. Jeff Sagarin’s poll, which has been
printed in USA Today since 1985, when fully calculated takes point spread into
consideration in order to serve as a predictor. However, his ELO-CHESS method
weighs only wins and losses, not margin of victory. The BCS utilizes only the ELO
CHESS rating in its calculations. Strength of schedule and conference ratings

are

used in each of the polls as one of many factors used to distinguish teams beyond
wins and losses. Because there are 120 teams pla>dng in Division I-FBS in addition
to games played against the lower divisions and each team plays no more tnan
thirteen games before the bowl season, it is impossible to obtain a statistically valid
interpretation ofthe teams’ strengths without further comparison.
WTiile the Colley Matnx focuses on wins and losses, the poll does adjust for
strength of schedule, which is adjusted on a weekly basis. The poll, however, does
not change its formula throughout the season to adjust for outliers. The formula is the
same, seeks to mininiize assumptions, and provides reproducible results. In order to
further the importance of the win or loss, margin of victory is not factored in for the
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Colley Matnx.

Dr. Peter Wolfe’s poll rates every varsity four year college team that

can be connected by common opponents. For instance, because Michigan played
Division I FCS team Appalachian State in 2007,the Wolfe ratings would be used for
every team Appalachian State played as well as every team their opponents played.
Dr. Wolfe’s formula seeks to predict which team would be most likely to win each
45

matchup.
Richard Billingsley is the president ofthe College Football Research Center,
and his poll ranks only the members of the Division I-FBS. The Billingsley Racings
do begin with a preseason ranking because “they are not all equal.” He believes that
starting all teams out even is m.cre unfair and illogical than giving them a preseason
ranking. His formula works in four phases. This preseason rating makes up the Frsi
phase, carr>dng over the team’s final ranking from the year before and ensuring that
there are not drastic changes throughout the first four weeks ofthe season. The
second phase gauges the strength ofthe opponent, and the third compares v/in/loss
records. The fourth and final phase takes into consideration such factors as location
ofthe game(home or away), defensive performance, and comparison ofoverall
records. Teams get a bonus for winning on the road, and there is a bonus for playing
46

on the road regardless of the game’s outcome.
The Massey Ratings purports itself as applicable to any competitive sports
league. The difference between the Massey Ratings and a few ofthe others is that it
does not attempt to predict outcomes. This system takes into consideration score,
venue, strength of schedule, and factors such as offensive power and defensive
44
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power.

The Anderson & Hester Ratings, printed in the Seattle Times,takes iilto

consideration wins over quality-opponents rather than margin of victory. The
strength of schedule is determined by the quality of opponents, opponents’ opponents,
and gauges the quality in light ofthe strength of the team’s conference. Each
conference is rated based on its nonconference record as well as the strength ofits
48

nonconference schedule.

While these polls aim for im.partiality, members of the less historically
recognized conferences complain that the strength of schedule and conference ratings
discriminate against their most competitive teams. For instance, in the 2007 Tostitos
Fiesta Bowl, Boise State defeated Oklahoma. Boise State won ail ofits games and
played in a BCS bowl, but because of its perceived weakness of schedule as a
member of the WAC,a one-loss Florida team from the SEC played undefeated Ohio
State from the Big Ten for the BCS Championship. Boise State finished with the
only undefeated record in Division I- FBS with a Fiesta Bowl wm over Oklahoma but
still finished behind the one-loss Florida team in the final BCS standings. WTiile
Boise State may not have plaj'ed as rigorous a schedule as Florida, what more could
they have done to earn a spot in the championship game? While the system allows
for a Boise State team to participate in the BCS,the system also makes it highly
unlikely that a team from the WAC or MAC will play in the BCS National
●
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Championship Game.
Another key player in the BCS agreements is television. WTiereas each bowl
once had to fend for itself in marketing its broadcast rights to the networks, under the

www.mraungs.com
www.andersonsports.com
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new agreement the five BCS games are sold as a package with the exception ofthe
Rose Bowl. Currently, the Fox Network owns the rights through 2010 for the BCS
National Championship Game as well as the Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta Bowls The
Rose Bow l has a contract with ABC through 2014. The Rose Bowl has a unique
relationship with the BCS in that it is not contractually a part ofthe BCS. Because
the Rose Bowl is contractually linked with the Big Ten and Pac-10, which are
members of the BCS agreement, the Rose Bowl Management Committee agrees to
essentially be a part of the BCS framework at the same time that it maintains its
autonomy. Because of its dominance ofthe television market share brought about by
the Big Ten representing the Midwestern United States and the Pac-10 carrying the
West Coast, the Rose Bowl has the ability to stand alone. In fact, the Rose Bowl
Management Committee maintains the right to annul its relationship with the BCS
should the nature of the agreement involving the Rose Bowl and the BCS change
49

without its approval.

The Rose Bowl maintained a competitive rating in the first two years ofthe
BCS when the Big Ten and Pac-10 were not a part ofthe agreement. In fact, the Rose
Bowl achieved higher ratings in 1995-96 and 1997-98 than the Bow'l Alliance’s
50

matchup between its top two ranked teams, For that reason, the Rose Bowl would
prefer the pre BCS arrangement in order to continually guarantee the Big Ten versus
Pac-10 m.atchup every year to ensure that guaranteed viewership. While the Big Ten
and Pac-10 v/ere also content to continue splitting the revenue garnered from that
anjiual contract, their most elite teams were being deprived ofthe opportimity to play
Determining a Champion...,40.
SandbroQk, John. “Division I-A Postseason Football History and Status,’ The Knight Foundation
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for what had become recognized as the national championship game, Ln effect, h-vo
of the most hisiorically powerful conferences were becoming second-class football
citizens amid the swiftly changing landscape of college football. At stake was a
growing disparity of perceived prestige as well as the guaranteed paycheck for
revenues from the oldest postseason football game. In the end, the Pac-10, Big Ten,
and Rose Bowl got the best of both worlds because of their marketing power and the
market share that the Rose Bowl commanded. The BCS conferences knew that they
needed the Big Ten and Pac-10 to have a legitimate claim at naming a national
champion. They also knew diat simply having the opportunity for a teahi from the
SEC or Big XII to play in the Rose Bowl would be a major coup. The eventual
agreement stipulated that the Big Ten and Pac-10 maintain their spots m the Rose
Bowl unless they were sending their conference champion to the BCS National
Championship Game. The only loser in this situation was

the Rose Bowl itself in that

while the Management Committee still maintained the ability to control the bowl s
television and naming rights, it now could potentially have to host a tearr: from the
ACC or Big East that would not bring along with it the guaranteed television market.
The current arrangement between the conferences and the bowl committees
gives the networks greater control in the administration of bowl games. No longer do
the bowl committees negotiate their ov/n corporate title sponsorships or even receive
royalties for the naming rights. Rather, the networks sell the naming rights lo
corporations and in turn pay a lump sum to the BCS bowls. Before the 3C S
dgreenients, the television networks were contractually obligated to broadcast the
civic events connected with the bowl games. The newfound brokering status allowed
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ABC to end its telecast of the Orange Bowl Parade which had been broadcast
nationally, and the parade was canceled in 1996. The Fiesta Bowl Parade went from
a national broadcast to a limited appearance on cable. The Rose Bowl,however, was
successful in continuing its national broadcast ofthe New Year’s Day Tournament of
Roses Parade. The significance ofthese new agreements lies in the newfound ability
of ABC to dictate the contracts v/ith the BCS and the Rose BowTs ability to exercise
autonomy that the other three BCS bowls could not. The contracts were not even
negotiated competitively until 2007 when Fox finally obtained the rights to the BCS
51

games and ABC continued its contract with the Rose Bowl.
A total of $96,160,000 was expected to be created in revenue for the 2006
BCS games. The non-BCS conference teams split $5,160,000 for agreeing to the
terms of the BCS. The remaining money was divided six ways evenly for the
participating teams of the Orange, Sugar,and Fiesta Bowls. The Rose Bowl has a
unique contract to distribute its revenue to the participating teams. Conferences with
t’A'o teams in BCS games are rewarded with an additional $4,500,000. Any other
revenues after these payments are divided evenly among the six amiu^ automatic
qualifying conferences. These conferences then divide the winnings among each of
52

their member institutions.

At stake are millions of dollars and the priceless exposure that these elite bowl
games provide. The non-BCS conferences, first and foremost, desire equal access to
the money and publicity for their universities in order to ease the burdens on their
dih/etic departments. As football becomes more profitable, the cost of performing at
“Division i-A Postseason Football Histoiy and Status...”
Schinidt. Jude D.“A Fresh Set of Dov/ns? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl Championship
Sei ie'i Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act,” The Sports Lawyers Journal(Spri.ng 2C07).
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the highest level rises and makes it increasingly difficult to win the BCS money
without already hav ing a large budget, the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots”
widens each year. The programs that can obtain the most money for athletics can
build the best facilities and pay the best coaches in order to recruit the most talented
players When six conferences are guaranteeing financial relief every year from the
BCS for their member institutions and all the rest are forced to work much harder to
achieve the same financial awards, the burdens on the non-BCS institutions pile on
more and more each year.
In order to avoid legal action by the non-BCS conferences and the threat of
legislation from Congress, the BCS agreement was revisited once again and goes into
effect after the 2007 season. Under these new arrangements, a conference’s status as
an automatic BCS qualifier will be evaluated annually based on its overall
performance in the four preceding seasons. The champions of at least five and no
more than seven conferences will be awarded an automatic bid to a BCi game.
Essentially, in order for any ofthe five current non-BCS conferences to qualify for
automatic status, they must perform on the same level as or better than at least one of
53

the SIX original BCS conferences,

This new tweak to the BCS qualification process

would seem to finally put every conference on a level playing field. Ihe five nonBCS conferences were brought into the agreement in 2004 after the 2003
Congressional hearings which lead to the inclusion of Utah m the 2004 Fiesta Bowi,
Boise State in the 2006 Fiesta Bowl, and Hawaii in the 2007 Sugar Bowl. These
agreements served to silence the BCS’s most vocal academic critic, Tulane president
Scoit S. Cowen who appeared before Congress in 2003 claiming the BCS presented a
“A Fiet.h Set of Downs. .
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violation o:'antitrust law. The 2004 agreement led Cowen to state “From this day
forward we’ll no longer talk about two sides. We now are on one side whether we
»54

call it the B.C.S., the A.B.C. or the X.Y.Z.

Are there lingering antitrust issues with the BCS agreements? It would seem
that the inclusion of all eleven Division I-FBS conferences in the new contracts with
the opportunity for all to earn automatic bids would silence any antitrust. In all
likelihood, there will be no antitrust litigation brought against the BCS with the new
adjustments. The greatest threat in that regard was posed by Cowen and his
Presidential Coalition of Athletic Reform which was made up of44 university
presidents who were outside of the BCS structure. Essentially, the coalition sought
equal access to the payouts available to teams within the BCS framework. While the
opportunity to play for a national championship is certainly an important goal, these
presidents more than anything desired a spot in the BCS in order to compete. Once
these presidents and conferences entered into the BCS equation, the complaints of
restricted access have ceased. However,should the new adjustments not have the
desired leveling effect, it stands to reason that litigation could arise in the future.
Writing for the Sports Lawyers Journal, Jude D. Schmit believes that the new
qualification framework will make it more difficult for the non-BCS conferences
because of the computer poll emphasis on strength ofschedule. While these p'olls
aim CO minimize any bias based on region or history, the historically powerful teams
will find themselves at the top of the strength ofschedule rankings every year. In
order to ensure that their positions at the top are maintained, Schmit believes the

B.C.S .4^dds Fifth Game And Access For Have-Nots,” Joe Drape, The New York Times, \ March
2004.
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original BCS leams will avoid scheduling games with the non-BCS teams to keep
their own schedules strong and the non-BCS schedules weak, they certainly will not
play games at non-BCS stadiums. This policy will force the non-BCS teams to
schedule v/eaker opponents from other non-BCS.conferences and lower divisions or
have to play games on the road against the original BCS teams. At the same time
however, with the addition ofthe twelfth game to the regular season, BCS institutions
must fill up their home schedule. In order to do so, many must schedule teams from
the non-BCS conferences and in doing so pay out hundreds ofthousands of dollars in
appearance fees. In 2006, for example, Nebraska paid Troy $750,000 to play them in
Lincoln, and Iowa paid Montana $600,000 to come to Iowa City. The fees are paid
because they are for one game only rather than '‘home-and-home” agreements in
which teams sign on to play one game at each school’s home stadium. Lsually tnere
IS not a significant amount of money exchanged in home-and-home contracts because
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both teams benefit from a home game.
For Ohio State or Alabama who have no problem selling out ever> game,
this trend is not a problem. However, for Mississippi State or Baylor, the proi^es^ gets
expensive. One way to cut these costs would be to agree to a home-and-home deal,
but Ohio State traveling to play Kent State simply would never happen. Ohio State
would nave nothing to gain and everything to lose in this scenario. Thus,the system
of non-BCS teams being forced to play their BCS opponents on the road will continue
56

to maintain the gap.

In College Football, Big Paydays for Humiliation”, The New York Times, Pete Tliamel. 2'i August
2006.
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A.S the contracts are currently drawn up, any challenge to the BCS on the basis
of antitrust violation would end in futility. The face ofthe agreements provides for a
level olaying field with pro-competitive goals. However,the effects over the next
five to ten years may prove to maintain the anticompetitive two-tiered system before
2004. If the question is simply over television exposure and access to the revenue
generated by the BCS games then the BCS has served its purpose. Certaii?.iy, the vast
majority of university presidents are concerned with balancing their institution s
budget before they talk about which team is actually the best in college football. For
the presidents of the non-BCS conferences, before any other issue could be remedied,
they had to find a place at the BCS bargaining table. Now that they have achieved
that access, the question remains of whether they will further pursue a shakeup ofthe
postseason structure.
As recently as January of 2008, University of Georgia presideni Michael F.
Adams called fo^ an eight-team* playofffollowing the exclusion of Georgia from the
BCS National Championship Game. ThJs statement came only a year after Florida
president Bernard Machen made the same overtures to his fellov/ presidents.
However,these proposals seem to be more aimed at appeasing frustrated alumjii than
beginning the upheaval ofthe bowl system. Such an upheaval will have to come
from, more than one president with angry alumni. Because ofthe settled legai status
ofthe BCS,it will have to come from somewhere other than litigation at this juncture.
The heari ofthe issue deals much more with an ethical question than, a legal question.
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Chapter Three
Ethical Implications of the Bowl System
While a legal challenge to the BCS is highly unlikely to occur, much less
topple the bowl system, there could be ethical questions raised against the system as it
has evolved over the past thirty years. While every other NCAA sanctioned sport is
regulated by the NCAA and names a champion, there has never been a NCAA
champion in the history ofthe highest subdivision ofcollege football. The Division-I
men’s basketball tournament generates high ratings and revenue, but the sport allows
for equal opportunity for all of its members and succeeds in maintaining a perception
of freedom from comunercialization There is no corporate sponsor with naming
rights to the Final Four, while the Sugar Bowl has a different title sponsor every year.
This contrast contributes to the perception that college football has become nothing
short of a big-business endeavor. Institutions and conferences seem to be concerned
with ratings and advertisement sales more than the game itself or the athletes for
whom the institutions are supposed to be providing an education.
To state that universities desire to maintain the bowl system simply to enri.ch
their own pockets would be a dangerously cynical position to take, though it may
carry some merit. Over the past fifteen years as the BCS has evolved, presidents and
athletic directors have accumulated numerous arguments in favor of the bowl system
as opposed to a playoff in any form. These arguments range from concerns for the
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welfai*e of the student-athlete to devaluation ofthe regular season and traditional
rivalries, in 2005, University of Mississippi Chancellor Robert Khayat provided a
variety of arguments against a playoffin his testimony before the House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce. He invoked a commitment to
academic standards, stating that a playoff would draw out the postseason far into
January which would conflict with the beginning ofspring semester at many schools
as well as basketball season. Khayat’s academic concerns are contradictory in that it
supposes two separate standards for basketball players and football players. Why is it
not a problem for basketball season to conflict with the beginning of spring semester
but for football players it would be? The rest of Khayat’s reasons prove to be
difficult to support concretely, including his concerns that the “umqueness’' of college
football would be lost and that it would essentially conflict with the status quo of
football- Perhaps Khayat’s strongest and most honest statement in the hearing is that
it is every institution’s goal to strengthen its conference in order to balance the
budget. Because of the SEC’s bowl tie-ins, its policy of dividing bowl revenues, and
the SEC regular season television contract, the University of Mississippi is able to
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balance its athletic budget even when ticket sales are down.
Khayat’s arguments fit in the same framework of piecemealed excuses
heralded by Jim Delaney, the commissioner ofthe Big Ten, one of the most
outspoken opponents of a playoff. Delaney told Congress that a playoff would be out
ofthe question because it would devalue the regular season and take money as well as
the attention of fans and media away from the bowls in addition to “inevitably
[altering] the character of the bowls.” These contentions are simply circular
Determining a Champion on the Field..., 31.

.
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reasoning: if you take away the bowls,the bowl system will be damaged. His most
legitimate basis for an aversion to a playoffstems from his desire to protect the
importance of the Rose Bowl and his conference’s place in it. For that reason, he also
opposes the “Plus One” model, which would provide for a national championship
game following the bowls. He opposes this model because it could potentially
devalue the Rose Bowl. Any devaluation ofthe Rose Bowl would be detrimental to
his conference, and his primary job is to protect his conference,^^ Delaney represents
two of the greatest obstacles to a playoff as a conference commissioner and a
beneficiary ofthe historic relationship between the Big Ten and the Rose Bowl.
Delaney has been quoted as saying “I don’t work for college football at large. No
other conference commissioner has the market power and influence Delaney holds as
the commissioner of the conference with nearly 25% of American television
households. This position makes the television broadcast rights for Big Ten regular
season games as well as the Rose Bowl very desirable for the television networks.
Like Khayat and many other university presidents, Delaney cites academic
concerns with the rigors of a playoff BCS bowl bound teams hold more than three
times the normal number of practices for one game between the end ofthe regular
season and their bowl game. Ohio State beat Michigan on November 17 2007 in
their final regular season game, and then waited nearly two months to play Louisiana
State in the BCS National Championship Game on January 7,2008. Dunng that
lime, the players were lifting weights, going to practice, watching film, and attending
team meetings. To say that a playoff would unduly burden students more than the

Determining a Champion on the Field.. 25-28.
Peter, Josh. “Playoff Plunderer,” www.sports.yahoo.com (January 5, 2007; Febmary 28,2008)
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current system would simply be absurd. In 2003 Myles Brand,the president ofthe
University of Indiana from 1994 to 2002 and current executive director of the NCAA,
told the United States Senate “I do not[favor a playoff], not because I believe it is
academ.icaily unsound, but rather because it would diminish the tradition and benefits
of the bowls. This assertion from the head ofthe organization charged with ensuring
academic integrity in collegiate sports serves to derail the academic contentions with
a playoff. The academic argument is a diversion that is invoked to create an easily
60

agreeable line of reasoning.

Another popular argument used against a system of playoffs is the potential
devaluation of the regulai* season. Delaney believes that “A multi-game playoff
format[ ..] will transform a season-ending showdown between an unbeaten Ohio
«6!

State and unbeaten Michigan into a game over playoff seeding.

Harvey S.

Perlman, the chancellor at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, argues that v/ere a
plavoff in place, games between lower ranked teams would lose significance because
so many teams would be eliminated for losing games early in the season. The bowl
system, he argues, allows for every game to be relevant because all a team has to do
62

is win six games to achieve bowl eligibility.
The real concern for the importance ofregular season games stems from theF
value as a television package. Were a playoffinstituted, the rev^ue distributed to all
conferences would increase, but the increase in postseason money could mean a
decrease in the contracts for the regular season games. Regular season broadcast
60
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contracts are negotiated by each conference, and all revenues are split by the
universities in the conference. Therefore, it is essential to maximize
the value of
/
these broadcast packages.^^ Perlman even goes so far as to state that the significance
of the 2003 matchup of the unusually ranked Northern Illinois and Bowling Green
teams came from the national broadcast ofthe game and the presence ofthe popular
ESPN program “College Game Day.” He even invoked the term “Cinderella team to
describe the accomplislmient of Northern Illinois in beating three teams fi*om BCS
conferences. Certainly the achievement was significant, but ultimately neither team
64

had any realistic opportunity to compete for a national championship.
Fiesta Bowl President and CEO John Junker told a congressional committee
that “[the bowl system] is something unique in sports, it is something that serves

as a

lifetime memory, and it is something that is well deserved by the young men who
break their bones and spill their blood for the revenue necessary to fulfill all the needs
that financially have [...] to fulfill obligations for Title D(, Olympic sports, and other
things.” Essentially, Junker’s statement sums up the key reasoning behind many
university presidents’ desire to maintain the bowl system. Junker understands that
college football has become an investment for universities to balance their athletic
budgets. There is no doubt that the bowls present a wonderful opportunity for young
men to be able to travel across the country and be rewarded for their hard work,but
the reward for the players certainly is not the most important stimulus for the bowl
games
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In the 2004-2005 academic year, only 23 Division I athletic departments made
more revenue than they spent. In the same year 53 Division I-A football programs
made more money than they spent. The excess revenue is redistributed to the rest of
the university’s athletic programs. The largest reported revenue by one program

was

$53 million with the Division I-A average for the 117 members at the time being $10
million. That distribution displays a vast disparity by the programs at the top and
66

those at the bottom.

In 2002, Nebraska generated more than $50 million in athletic

revenues with $21 million coming from home football game revenues. Ofthat $2i
million, only $1.2 million came from BCS revenues. While Perlman points to this
statistic as proof that the bov/ls are not significant in enriching their programs, that
viewpoint ignores a broader perspective ofthe effects of participation in a BCS game,
not to mention that very few BCS schools can generate the level ofrevenue Nebraska
enjoys. The exposure and prestige of a Sugar Bowl berth, for example, helps spike
sales ofteam merchandise and season tickets as well as encourages alumni donations,
facility expansion, and the likelihood of obtaining contracts for nationally broadcast
games the following season.^^ Also Perlman does not make mention ofthe fact that
Nebraska played well enough to make the BCS championship game in the Rose Bowl
that year, so revenues from football would be particularly high. Also Nebraska has
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sold out every home game from 1962 to 2008.
In 2007 Ohio State’s athletic department functioned with $109 million in
operating expenses. At the same time, fellow Division I member Alcorn State had an

Brand, Myles. Letter to The Honorable William Thomas, Chairman of House Committee on Ways
and Means from Myles Brand, 13 November 2006,15-16.
BCSorBust...,ll-n.
www.huskers.com.
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operating budget of $3,172,348. In fact, the Florida basketball expense-per-player
comes out to three times the entire Alcorn State basketball budget. Alcom State is a
member of Division I-FCS, but they do compete on the same level as ACC and Big
East teams in basketball. Ohio State has a much larger student body and the benefit
of flagship status in Ohio, but the main reasons they are able to generate so much
revenue are the success and history of their football program, the capacity oftheir
stadium, and the number of living alumni who make donations. With such a vast
disparity, so few programs breaking even, the number ofnonrevenue sports and Title
IX to consider, the ability to generate revenue becomes increasingly important and
69

difficult for a university struggling to balance its athletic budget.
So why do Ohio State and Nebraska want to maintain their share ofthe BCS
money if it is as insignificant to their total revenues and budgets as they suggest? As
already established, the money earned from BCS appearances goes far beyond the
cash rewards for participation, butjust as important to those dividends is the gatekeeping ability that the bowl system provides the elite teams. So long as there are
obstacles in place for teams from non-BCS conferences, the level ofcompetition goes
down and the cost of competing is lower. The notion of universities keeping athletic
expenditures lower may seem ridiculous to the cynical observer as athletic
departments spend more every year and head football coaches making more than $1
million a year becomes more common. While the competition at the top ofFBS
increases every year, those top-tier programs want to do everything to prevent having
to compete with non-BCS teams. Barring these teams from substantive exposure

O’Neil, Dana. “Alcom State facing constant battles as Division I have-not,” wv/w.espn.com
(Febmaiy 15, 2008; Febmary 28, 2008).

45

means that there are not as many teams to recruit and spend against. The comparative
value of the BCS payouts also plays a large part in this dichotomy. A $1.2 million
pay check is a much more significant boost for an Iowa State athletic department that
generated $28 million from all of its athletics in the 2004-2005 academic year, even if
SI.2 m.illion only makes up 5% of Nebraska’s football revenues. When athletic
departments are unable to balance their budgets, the difference is made up in fees to
students and general university funding. Of 154 Division I athletic departments
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studied by the Indianapolis Star, only 9% were able to run on their own revenues.
Essentially, costs go up every year, and universities try to maximize their
revenues while minimizing costs. Spending more money on the football program
ideally makes it more competitive and therefore more profitable. If universities can
lower the competition level, they can ideally control the cost of competition. While
the prevalence of million dollar coaches has become more common. Brand explains
in a letter to the U.S. House Connnittee on Ways and Means how these contracts
paid:
It is incorrect to assume that the compensation packages ofthe three or
four dozen football and men’s basketball coaches that exceed a million
dollars are the major contributors to their institutions’ athletics
budgets. Indeed,the average athletics budgets for the institutions with
“million dollar coaches” is approximately $50 million, in which the
compensation package represents 3.i percent ofthe budgets In most
cases. only a small percentage of the coaches’ overall compensation
packages are being paid by the institution. In addition to salaries,
coaches earn income from television appearances, shoe and apparel
contracts, endorsements, speaking engagements, and sports camps.
This approach parallels the way in which many of the top faculty at
these sam.e institutions are compensated. There are likely to be as
many as two dozen “million dollar faculty” members on each ofthese
campuses who earn a relatively small salary from the institution with
McCafferty, Joe “The Money Bowl: the real competition in sports is to see who can spend the
most,’CFO Magazine(August 1, 2006).
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are

the balance coming in the form of clinical and private practices, patent
royalties, consulting contracts, books, speaking engagements, and
sports camps. It should be noted, however, that faculty members have
the protection of tenure while coaches are employed at will and can be
dismissed for lack luster win-loss records or the inappropriate behavior
of 18- to 22-year olds.
Brand suggests that coaching compensation packages “are driven by market forces
just as faculty compensation is determined,

While the huge contracts can still be

disillusioning, the academic integrity of the institution is maintained because the vast
majority of the compensation plans are coming from outside funds which are
generated by the coach and would not have otherwise gone to the universit>'. Because
the successful head football coach brings in large revenue, it stands to reason that he
should be compensated accordingly. Just as the university desires the best possible
facilities and promotion, the best possible head football coach is instrumental in
building a program that will be successful in the win/loss column as well as in
generating revenue. To attract the best coaches,the market is forcing umversities to
offer more lucrative contracts. At the same time, alumni and media are more willing
to invest in the various elements ofthe compensation packages because the market
for college football has never been stronger.
The economics ofcollege football fueled by television and merchandising has
served to muddle the ideals of amateurism and commercialism m the college game,
most ostensibly through the relationship between the universities, television, and
corporate sponsors. The cynical view ofthe money-gmbbing president fails to take a
look at the larger goal. There are those who would argue that the commercialism of
college football jeopardizes the academic mission ofthe university athletic system.

Letter to the Honorable William Thomas . ,23.
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but it is because of the academic mission that university presidents have been so
willing to further the commercialization of the sport. In order to provide the best
opportunities for students to receive a higher education, the university must have
money for scholarships, facilities, faculty, and libraries among numerous other
expenditures. The athletic scholarship presents thousands ofstudents a chance to
attend college who would not afford the opportumty otherwise. Every year $1.5
billion is awarded to students at Division I and II schools to play a sport as well as
earn a degree. Any suggestion that the welfare and education ofstudents is not the
first priority of the presidents of these universities would be dangerous. They want to
provide the best education possible, and particularly at state umversities, to as many
qualified students as possible. Especially with the implementation of Title IX,
12

athletics has opened doors that were closed to previous generations.
In order to continue to provide these opportunities and even increase them,
presidents seek revenue through their football programs. The goal offurthering the
university’s ability to educate and research is correct, ethical, and noble. However,in
the pursuit of achieving this goal, university presidents have taken on a utilitarian
approach that is negative because ofthe disillusionment and conflict ofinterest it has
created through entanglement with television and commercialism in general. Tne
bowl system in particular highlights these contradictions through the way teams

are

selected as well as the issues with corporate sponsorship and not for profit status.
When bowl committees make their selections of which teams to invite, the>
take into consideration two major factors: the ability ofthe fan base to travel and the
marketability ofthe matchup for television. Perlman told the Senate that The
Letter to the Honorable William Thomas..., 1.
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networks want teams that will attract a fan base beyond their own ” At the same
hearing Keith Tribble, the chairman ofthe Football Bowl Association and the Orange
Bowl Committee, explained that these decisions are:
based on a business model, a model that looks at which schools can
travel, which schools have the appeal to television and so forth and so
on. The one [...] good point about having a lot of potential at-larges,
and yes, at some point we were looking at Northern Illinois because
they had a potential in [the Orange Bowl]. But we were going to look
at them just like the other six or seven schools that could have a
possibility for a potential slot in our game and make a business
decision based upon what is good for our area and what is good for our
economy and what is good for producing the things that we need to do
73
for the school.
Tribble’s explanation exemplifies why the bowl system is inconsistent with the
ethical missions of the university. In every other NCAA sport, teams are placed in
the post season based solely upon their performance on

the field ofplay. With

Division I-FBS, accomplishments on the field become a secondary consideration to
marketability. Certainly for Tribble and the Orange Bowl, consideration of Northern
Illinois for selection may have seemed like a step

toward equal opportunity, but when

Northern Illinois is held up to the standards ofTribble’s business model it will never
is denied advancement based on marketability over
be selected. Every time a team is
actual achievements, the notions of amateurism and fair play are a
Also contributing to this dilemma of ethics are the influences oftelevision and
corporate America over the post season process and formulation. Title sponsorship
for bowl games has presented itself as one ofthe more visible evid
commercialization ofcollege football. The practice has also brought iioi-for-profit
status into question as recently as the early 1990’s when the IRS raised concerns

BCS or Bust.

31,32.
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about an agreement between the Cotton Bowl Athletic Association(CBAA)and
Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil). Because the Internal Revenue Service(IRS)has
recognized that athletics have historically played an important role in higher
education, much of the revenue raised by football goes untaxed because it is
considered to be “substantially related to its exempt function.” In this particular case,
the CBAA and Mobil signed an agreement that would give $1.5 million to the CBAA
in exchange for promises to display the Mobil logo prominently, refer to the bowl
game as the Mobil Cotton Bowl, and mention the corporation in all ofthe bowl’s
press releases. If the game was not televised Mobil could back out, but ifthe game
achieved a certain Nielsen rating the CBAA could collect a greater sponsorship fee.
Because the agreement did not comprise a gift from Mobil to the CBAA and Mobil
received significant financial benefits as a result, the IRS determined that the
payments comprised income from advertising and should be taxable. Eventually,
Congress acted to relax the position ofthe IRS, but regardless the event provided a
deeper look into the nature ofthe modem bowl arrangement.
While bowl committees are being pressured by their corporate sponsors

to

produce huge ratings, the television networks may have greater influence in the
process. The networks have succeeded in eliminating the unwanted elements oi
many ofthe bowls, such as the Orange Bowl and Fiesta Bowl parades in order to
maximize ratings. Perhaps the most intriguing statistic regarding television and the
bowls is that in 2004 the Walt Disney Co., which owns ABC and the ESPN networks.

Guruli, Erin. “Commerciality of Collegiate Sports: Should the IRS Intercept?” Tke Sports Lawyers
Journal(Spring 2005).
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also owns the television licenses of 25 ofthe 28 bowl games/^ ESPN actually owns
four bowl games^^, not just their licensing rights.^’ When a television network
literally owns the postseason event, the game becomes a made-for-television event.
A strong argument can be made that the game now becomes a made-for-profit event
that serves absolutely no function in furthering the universities’ athletic missions of
fair play.
The NCAA sanctions and puts on the postseason tournaments for every other
sport, including the lower divisions of football because it has been deemed the
appropriate authority both practically and legally. The NCAA’s total authority over
the highest division of football effectively ended with the decision in hCAA v. Board
ofRegents ofthe University ofOklahoma, et al. Even efforts to enforce regulations
such as limits on assistant coaches’ salaries were struck down as violation of antitmst
78

law in Law v. NCAA.

With the courts essentially handcuffing the NCAA in its

administration of college football outside ofrules and academic standards, coU wge
football at the highest division has become subject to the major conferences,
television neU\'orks, and corporations that will put up the highest dollar. Because the
NCAA does not fiilly administrate the bowl games,the present structure may not be
in the best interest of college football as a whole. If a conference gives up an inch of
autonomy to the interests ofthe whole, another conference will take a mile.
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Division I-A Postseason Football History...
ESPN owns the Bell Helicopter Armed Forces Bowl,the PAPAJOHNS.COM Bowl,the Sheraton
Hawai’i Bcwl, and the Pioneer Las Vegas Bowl.
7?
PAPAJOHNS.COM Bcwl Press Release,
www.papajohnsbowl.com/press_release/espn regional.html, 9 May 2006,28 March 2008.
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Conference commissioners will not make sacrifices that would diminish their
constituents earnings even if it does contribute to fair play.
No other collegiate sport brings in the type of revenue that college football
accrues for many universities on a yearly basis. The money raised from football is
used to provide for not only the football programs, but also the rest of athletics in a
way that otherwise would not be possible. This money creates opportumties for more
students to get a college education who would not have been financially able
otherwise. Thus, in order to be able to provide for all student athletes, university
presidents invest m their football programs to increase revenues. These football
programs also serve as a unique linkage institution to alumni. The connection
between the university and the alumni is maintained through the annual football
schedule, which helps to bring in private donations that could be directed to
scholarships, faculty pay, and capital projects to improve opportumties for research
and learning. In the 2004-2005 academic year, donations contributed $845 million to
Division I-A athletics, making up 21% oftotal operating revenue. In order to
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maintain the flow ofthese donations, football teams must be successful.
As football programs provide opportunities for students, the mission of higher
learning is better served as a result ofthe revenue generated through television
contracts, merchandising, and ticket sales. The revenue generating capability and
activity of college athletics is not inherently unethical. However, when this revenue
is being generated through athletic events that have no greater purpose than simpiy
generating revenue, a profound ethical dilemma is occurring, particularly when
revenue is being made selling the likenesses for video games and jerseys of amateur
Letter to the Honorable William Thomas.... 24.
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18- to 22 year old college students. 'A^en Fiesta Bowl President John Junker makes
reference to “the young men who break their bones and spill their blood for the
revenue,’* he describes the situation with startling imagery and accuracy. Whether it
is ethical for these players not to be compensated for their contributions will not be
discussed in the paper, but it is certainly unethical when they are the workhorses in a
process that exists solely to generate revenue for the university. I suggest that if
Division I-FBS instituted a postseason playoff sanctioned by the NCAA,the ethical
goals of the universities’ athletic and academic missions would be better served.
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Chapter Four
A Playoff Solution
The current postseason format fails to satisfy the athletic missions of Division IFBS universities. In order to rectify the inconsistencies highlighted previously, the
conferences involved must come to an agreement that is ethical, equitable, and based
on more than mere revenue distribution. A NCAA sanctioned playoffcould meet the
monetary concerns while ensuring that a national champion is crowned based on their
accomplishments on the field and not politics offthe field. In order for a playoff not
to have the same characteristics as the BCS,many important factors must be taken
into consideration.
First and foremost, a playoff must provide equal opportumties for every team that
is recognized as a member of Division I-FBS. Every player should begin the season
with the mindset that he can in reality have a chance at winning the national
championship. If the NCAA recognizes all 120 members ofFBS as being apart of
the highest subdivision of football, each should be evaluated on the same standards.
A system of playoffs protects this equality and allows for tme conference and team
supremacy to be determined on the field of play. This point leads to the need for the
system to promote competitiveness over marketability. Teams should be selected
because of what they have accomplished on the field that season rathei than the size
of their fan bases. Teams historically regarded as "unmarketable" will become
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marketable in a system of playoffs because of the "Cinderella" moniker. At the same
time that competitiveness on the field must be promoted, contets for broadcasting
rights and playoff hosting designations must be conducted in an open and competitive
bidding process rather than behind closed doors between the same conferences,
networks, and bowl commissioners every year.
The best way to ensure that these goals are accomplished would be for the system
to be administered and regulated by the NCAA rather than at the conference level.
Such a situation would take conferences abdicating autonomy to the NCAA,which is
untliinkabie at this point because ofthe system that has evolved since the NCAA v.
Oklahoma decision. The Supreme Court has tied the hands ofthe NCAA,but if the
conferences were to concede autonomy to the NCAA and the NCAA were to apply
for antitrust exempt status from Congress as the NFL, Major League Baseball, and
the National Basketball Association have done, the legal diiemma would be
remedied, ic would take pressure from the government or tremendous market forces
for the conferences to undergo such a drastic change, and these possibilities are
highly unlikely any time soon. However,in the interest ofthe entirety ofcollege
fooiball and the ethical obligations ofthe universities to fair play and amateuiism,the
NCAA should usurp the autonomy ofthe conferences.
Conferences are interested in protecting the value ofthe regular season and
especially the significance of conference games. The broadcast packages for these
games are the most important source of unshared revenue for universities and
therefore must remain a key element to the process of crowning a national champion.
The regular season must also be prioritized to in order to make the playoffs an
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accomplishment for the truly elite teams. Also to consider is scheduling issues with
the NFL playoffs, final exams,spnng semester, and college basketball. Another
question to consider is the willingness of fans to travel to multiple games all over the
country’ if the gam.es v/ere hosted at various bowl sites. And what should be done
about the bowls?
Before these questions are addressed, the framework for the playoffsolution
must be laid out. See Appendix A. Twelve teams could qualify for the playoffs.
Four of these teams would receive first round byes. Each ofthese four teams must be
a conference champion or an independent team ranked in the top four ofthe ranking
formula. No conference can have more than two teams in the playoffs, fhe higher
seeded teams will host the first two rounds ofthe playoffs at their home stadiums.
Bowl sites and cities will take part in a competitive bid process to play host ofthe
semifinal and final games of the playoffs, so three bowls will have the opportunity to
host a piayoff game. Playoff teams will be selected and seeded by a NCAA
committee made up of administrators from the eleven different conferences, similar to
the selection committee for the NCA.A men's and women's basketball tournaments.
The formula used for the BCS,or one like it, would be used by the committee to
evaluate tournament worthy teams and seeding. The top four ranked conference
champions in the formula would receive the first round byes. See Appendix B for
how the playoffs would have been seeded using the 2007 final BCS standings.
The first issue to be considered is the distribution ofrevenues from the playoffs.
A base percentage ofthe total revenue would be distributed evenly among all eleven
conferences. Conferences with teams making the playoffs will receive a bonus for
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each team participating and for each round the team or teams advance. The lop four
seeded teams will receive the same bonus as a team advancing from the first round to
the second round. The host teams will keep revenues from the game at their home
stadium. Because the higher seed always hosts and the second round is hosted by the
top four seeds, no team hosts more than one game. This system makes the ability ofa
team to go undefeated with a difficult schedule and win its conference that much
more valuable. If a team can finish in the top eight, it can earn more money for itself.
Bonuses are also given to conferences with teams advancing to the semifinal and final
games. Any leftover revenue would be distributed evenly among the conferences.
Having the games hosted by the higher seeded teams addresses the question of
whether fans will be willing to travel for four games. Fans will only have to travel
long distances for the semifinal and final games, but in all likelihood these games
would be sold out long before the participants ofthe games are even known, as
happens with the Final Four in men's basketball every year. The bowl game sites
les
acting as hosts will provide economic impact and exposure for three different cit
every year and give the teams advancing the opportunity to travel and experience
another part of the country.
Most importantly, however,the academic and athletic missions ofthe universities
involved will be achieved without conflict ofinterest. Certainly there will aiways be
an argument over whether a team should have been in or out ofthe playoffs, but the
argument will carry less weight than arguments over situations like Auburn in 2004
and Boise State in 2006. It will be clear that NCAA Division L FES exists to have a
champion, not merely to generate revenue. At the same time, the playoffs will
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continue to generate and distribute revenue in a way that will be fair and ethical.
Revenue will be awarded fairly and based on performance on the field rather than
marketability and historical success. On the issue ofinterference with final exams
and the beginning of spring semester, the playoffs easily fit into the timefi*ame in
which the bowls already are scheduled. See Appendix C for how the playoffs could
have been scheduled for the 2007-2008 postseason. This scheduling would not
conflict with the NFL playoffs as well as the beginning ofthe spring semester for the
vast majority of universities. Even if the universities involved with the national
championship game begin spring classes the first week of January, no more than two
universities will be affected. Also, the BCS National Championship Game already
goes into that week,so proponents ofthe BCS cannot use this argument against a
playoff.
The question of what would become ofthe other bowls still looms with the
creation of a postseason playoffsystem. Without question, the value or the most
prestigious bowls would immediately drop, but in the current system there are already
tiers of prestige with only five games in the top tier. The bowl games that annually
match higher ranked teams from the historically powerful conferences, such as the
Capitol One Bowl and the Outback Bowl, already draw larger audiences and crowds
than the likes of the GMAC Bowl and the International Bowl. It could be argued that
these bowl games do not lose any meaning under a playoff system because they
would still be match-ups between teams fi'om different regions ofthe country that do
not play any part in the crowning ofthe national champion. With no more than two
teams from any one conference making the playoffs, there will still be enough highly
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ranked teams outside of the playoffs to provide compelling match-ups for bowl
games.
The bowls could still exist and continue to provide the same opportunities and
economic impact on communities, new experiences for student athletes, and exposure
for universities. The payouts would certainly decline, but the contracts and prestige
of the individual bowls would be determined by the market. The Fiesta Bowl
provides an example of how a bowl can rise to prominence because ofthe market, as
it has replaced the Cotton Bowl as one ofthe four elite bowl games. Hov/ever, as the
system stands currently, it would be impossible for another bowl game to achieve
such status because the BCS maintains the status quo rather than allow for
prominence to be decided competitively.
Bowl games are not intrinsically unethical or crooked. They have contributed
positively to communities and universities for decades. The view ofthe bowl game as
a business investment and stimulus for community interest and improvement does not
make them wrong, and in previous eras there would be nothing unethical with these
postseason events being no more than tliat. In today’s world ofcollege athletics,the
cost of competing has turned these events into commercialized contests that have
nothing to do with the student athletes and cross country interaction as some may
argue was the case in earlier days. The system has gone astray, and tlie answer is to
redirect the focus of the universities to the original mission offurthering academic
opportunities at the same time that student athletes work to accomplish their goals on
the field is to create a new system that leaves no room for argument over who won
the national championship on the field. Such a system would make enormous
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monetary profit, but the profit would be distributed based on performance and an
outlook that treats all conferences equally. This new system would serve the best
interests of all parties involved and create a new era of college football that is not
tarnished by corruption, favoritism, and commercialization, but rather would he
characterized by fairness, equal opportunity, and competitiveness.
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Conclusion
The financial leverage that the bowl system has placed hold on college
athletics makes any change in the format of postseason football extremely
problematic and unlikely. The relationships between the conferences, bowls,
networks, and communities in many cases have existed for decades. These games
have become institutions with infrastructures in place that would be difficult to
deconstruct and refomi. The wall of support for the current system represented by
university presidents, bowl executives, and conference commissioners makes any
movement to a playoff almost unthinkable in the near future. Pennsylvania and Notre
Dame in the 1950’s exemplify what can happen when universities act unilaterally
against the majority of college football, and the courts have disarmed the NCAA from
reigning in the conferences. The 2007 changes to the BCS have safeguarded it from
legal action for the near future, and the NCAA continues to play a minor role in the
administration of the postseason. The most successful stimulus for reform in the
postseason of college football over the past twenty years has been Congress. Should
the BCS continue to bar teams and conferences from substantive access at the same
time that fans are frustrated by split championships. Congress could step in again and
force change.
No significant change will come before 2014 when the Rose BowPs contract
with ABC mns out. Were Notre Dame to join the Big Ten within that time period,
the Rose Bowl would become so valuable that the network, bowl committee, and
conferences would be able to compete against every other postseason scenario
without worrying about losing television market share to the rest ofcollege football.
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That situation would require Notre Dame to give up its position as the only team with
its own broadcasting deal, something that is highly unlikely to happen. The way that
free trade economics has been applied to college football by the courts has allowed
for the system to fa\ or the universities with the largest television audiences to do
however they please whether it is good for college football as a whole or not.
What this thesis proposes does not take away from the ability of universities
to negotiate their television contracts or conference alignments. This system does not
make any university tear down its facilities or give up scholarships. There are no
calls for a Marxist uprising by the “have-nots” of college football or even an
automatic qualifier for all conference champions into the playoffs. Rather, this
system would provide a framev/ork tliat would allow for every team to have the
ability to earn its position in the realm of college football. The universities with the
most power and prestige wish to maintain the status quo ofcollege football because it
benefits them, and they cannot afford to give up the positions they already have. For
the presidents of the universities to look at the situation and consider what is best for
the whole of college football will require an acknowledgement and commitment to
fairness and equal opportunity. The system as it stands fails to protect these
principles. Regardless of the upheaval it would require, university iM-esidents should
take the measures necessary to extend equal opportumty to all ofits athletes as well
as all of the academic institutions at the Division I-FBS level.
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Appendix A

Round 1

At I liuhcr Seed

Round 2

At Hiiiher Seed

Round 3

Round 4

Neutral Sites

Neutral Site

8*

9 Game 1
1

Game 5

5

12 Game 2

Game 9
4 Game 6

7

10 Game 3
2 Game 7
Game 11

6
Game 10

1 1 Game 4
3 Game 8

*Represents seeding.

Champion

Appendix B

Round 1

At Higher Seed

Round 2

At Higher Seed

Round 3

Round 4

Neutral Sites

Neutral Site

8*West Virginia

9 Arizona Slate
1

Ohio State

5 Georiga

12 Boston College
4 Oklahoma
7 Southern California

10 Hawaii
2 LSU
6 Missouri

11 Illinois
3 Virginia Tech

*
Represents seeding.
Breakdown by conference:
ACC: Virginia Tech, Boston College
Big XII: Oklahoma, Missouri
Big East: West Virginia
Big Ten: Ohio State, Illinois
SEC: LSU, Georgia
Pac-10: Southern California, Arizona State
WAC: Hawaii

Champion

Appendix C

DcccmhiT 2007 .l:inuar> 2U0S
Sun

Mon

Tucs

Wed

Thurs

Fri

Sal
Conf. Champs.-!

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

II

12

13

14

Game 1/Gamc 2- IS

17

18

19

20

21

Game 5/Game 6-22

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

2

3

4

5

6

7

Game 9/ Game 10 -1
Game 11
-8

9

10

II

12

■>

9

I

(Janu- 3 (iaim- 4-16
(ianu- 6/(iuine 7

23

65

Bibliography
Newspapers:
The New York Times(New York, New York)
Books:
Dunnavant, Kcitli. The Fifty Year Seduction. New York: St. Martin’s Press,2004.
Watterson, John Sayle. College Football: History, Spectacle, Controversy. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 2002.
Articles:
Ouruli, Erin. “Commerciality of Collegiate Sports: Should the IRS Intercept? The
Sports Lawyers Journal(Spring 2005).
Maisel, Ivan. “To Carefully Go Where 1-A Has Never Gone Before,”
(December 20, 1993).
McCafferty, Joe. “The Money Bowk the real competition in sports is to see who can
spend the most,’" CFO Magazine(August 1,2006).
O’Neil, Dana.“Alcorn State facing constant battles as Division I have-not,
www.espn.com (February 15,2008; February 28,2008).
Peter, Josh. “Playoff Plunderer,” www.sports.yahoo.com (January 5, -tO , e ruary
28 2008)
Sandbrook, John. “Division I-A Postseason Football History and
The Knight
Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics
t, p ^
Schmidt Jude D.“A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to me bowl
Championship Series Still Draw a Flag Under me Sherman Act, e ● ports
Lawyers Journal(Spring 2007).
Valentin, Iram. “Title IX: A Brief History,” WEEA Equity Resource tenter Digest
1997).
Young, Charles E.“College Football Could Have a Real Champion,” The Chronicle
ofHigher Education (January 9,2004).
Government Publications:
Antitrust Implications ofthe College Bowl Alliance, Hearing Bfore the ^
Subcommittee on Antitrust Business Rights, and CompelUwn of ec ommi ee
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 22 May 199'7(Washington: U.S.
Government Press, 1997).
66

BCS ur Bust ● Lompcuiivc and Economic Effects ofthe Bowl Championship Series On
and Off the Field, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, OcXohQT 2%
2003,(Washington: U.S. Government Press, 2003).
Brand. Myles. Letter to the Honorable William Thomas, Chairman ofHouse
Committee on Ways and Means from Myles Brand, 13 November 2006.
Determining a Champion on the Field: A Comprehensive Review ofthe BCSand
Postseason College Football, Hearing Before the Subcommittee Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection ofthe Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House oj Representatives, 1 December 2005 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2005).
NCAA
Board ofRegents ofthe University ofOklahoma, etal, 1984.
Websites:
WWW.andersonsports.com.
www.cfrc.com.
www.colleyrankings.com.
www.harrisinteractive.com.
www.huskers.com.
www.mratings.com.
www.pnvolfe.bol.ucla.edu.
www.usatoday com.
www.womenssportsfoundation.org.
Press Rdeases and NCAA Publications:
NCAA 2006-G7 Postseason Football Handbook.
PAPAJOHNS.COM Bowl Press Release,
W'WW.papajohnsbowl.com/press_release/espn_regional.html. May 9,2006,

March 28, 2008.

67

